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Constitutional Criminal Procedure
by Edward D. Lukemire*
and
John Lynch"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year's survey of Eleventh Circuit criminal cases is primarily a
review of those decisions which involve significant constitutional issues.
As in recent years, a substantial number of the court's decisions resulted
from drug prosecutions. This is due to the increase in federal resources
devoted to drug prosecutions and the substantially longer sentences
which often result from a federal drug conviction as compared to a state
conviction for the same offense. The court also decided a great many
cases involving issued interpreting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Even though these cases do not usually involve constitutional issues, the
authors decided to include a Sentencing Guidelines section because this
area of law has such a significant affect on the federal criminal law
practitioner.
Even though both authors are career prosecutors, this article is not
intended to present a "prosecution view" of the cases and issues
discussed. Rather, our purpose is to provide all federal criminal law
practitioners with a review of those decisions in the Eleventh Circuit
which involve significant issues or developments.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT

In United States v. Ford,' the Eleventh Circuit decided for the first
time whether surveillance of a home by law enforcement officers using
a thermal imager constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
In that case, the defendant owned a mobile home which was located on
land leased by Ford and his co-defendant in Venus, Florida.2 Law
enforcement officers received information that the defendants were
growing marijuana inside the mobile home. The officers entered the
defendants' property over a locked gate and traveled a quarter of a mile
onto the leased property where they established surveillance in thick
foliage approximately thirty-five yards from the mobile home.3
An agent viewed the mobile home through a thermal imager, which is
a passive, non-intrusive device which measures infrared heat.4 The
agent determined that the mobile home was emitting an inordinate
amount of heat through its floor and walls which was consistent with the
generation of excess heat from artificial lights used in indoor marijuana
growing operations.5 Based on information gained from the thermal
imager and from other sources, the agents obtained a search warrant for
the mobile home.6 When the agents executed the search warrant, they
discovered a sophisticated hydroponic laboratory and over four hundred
marijuana plants.'
On appeal, Ford challenged the district court's denial of his suppression motion in which he contended that the use of the thermal imager
to detect heat emitted from his mobile home was an unconstitutional,
warrantless search! The Eleventh Circuit held that thermal imagery,
as used by the agents in this case, was not an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.9 The court determined that Ford made
no attempt to conceal the heat generated by his marijuana operation.
Thus, he did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat
emitted by his mobile home.' Even if Ford had a subjective expectation of privacy in his vented heat, the court stated that it is not one that

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 995.
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society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable." The court
noted that, like aerial photography, thermal imagery is incapable of
revealing the intimacy of detail and activity protected by the Fourth
Amendment.' The court observed that the thermal imager operates
by detecting differences in the surface temperatures of objects and
cannot penetrate
walls or windows to reveal conversations or human
1
activities.

3

A significant issue which was not addressed by the court was whether
the agents conducted a warrantless search by invading the curtilage of
the mobile home. 4 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the defendant
waived the
curtilage issue by not raising it in his pretrial suppression
6
motion.'
In United States v. McGregor,6 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether law enforcement officers created exigent circumstances
when they made a warrantless entry into the defendant's house. United
States Customs inspectors at a mail examining facility in Miami
discovered cocaine in a package that had been sent from Peru. 7 The
inspectors decided to make a controlled delivery and obtained a warrant
to place a beeper inside the package of cocaine; the beeper would alert
the inspectors when the package was opened.'" The package was
delivered to McGregor's home and the agents set up surveillance outside
the home.' 9 Almost six hours after the delivery, the beeper sounded
indicating that the package had been opened.' The inspectors then
entered the defendant's house without a warrant and arrested him.2
In a motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the agents created
the exigency by planting the beeper in the package, and that this made
their warrantless search unreasonable.' The majority of the Eleventh
Circuit panel disagreed stating that the planting of the beeper did not
create the exigency.' The exigency resulted from the package being

11. Id. at 997.
12.

Id. at 996.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 994.
Id.
31 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1068.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 1069.

23. Id.
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The court deteropened and the tracing device being discovered.'
mined that the agents reasonably believed that, once the package was
opened, the cocaine could be destroyed if they did not immediately take
action.' The court placed particular emphasis on the agents' uncertainty regarding when, where, or -bywhom the package would be opened,
although McGregor was suspected.2' The court concluded that, under
the circumstances of this case, including the disposability of the cocaine,
the inspectors did not act unreasonably when they decided that
obtaining a warrant would be impractical. 27
There were some troubling facts in this case which lent credence to the
dissenting judge's position that the agents created the exigency and a
warrant could have been obtained. Prior to the delivery of the package,
the inspectors initially attempted to get a warrant from a Florida state
magistrate to enter McGregor's home if the beeper sounded.2" These
efforts were abandoned when they were informed that, under Florida
law, they were required to wait fifteen minutes after the beeper sounded
before entering the house. The dissenting judge also noted that the
agents had over five hours before the beeper indicated that the package
had been opened to obtain a federal warrant, which would not have
contained the waiting period required under Florida law.80 This case
is an illustration of the reluctance by judges to second-guess judgment
calls of law enforcement officers made during rapidly developing
undercover investigations, unless they appear to be inherently unreasonable or made in bad faith.
In United States v. Smith,"'the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue
of standing to object to the warrantless search of a letter which
contained LSD. In that case, United States Postal inspectors had
obtained information that Smith was receiving LSD through the mail.32
In the course of the investigation, the inspector learned that Smith had
asked a mail carrier about mail going to another person's address.'
The inspector subsequently intercepted an envelope addressed to this
other person which bore a crossed-out address to Smith. 4 The inspec-

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1068.
Id.
Id. at 1071, 1073 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
39 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1144.
Id.
Id.
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tor confronted the recipient of the letter and informed her that they
believed she was being used to receive drugs in the mail. 5 The
addressee of the letter said that the letter belonged to Smith, but she
gave the inspector permission to open the letter in her presence.' The
envelope contained LSD impregnated on blotter paper." Prior to trial,
Smith filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the envelope.'
The Eleventh Circuit held that Smith did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the envelope and thus had no standing to object
to the search of its contents. 9 The court ,based this decision on
equivocal testimony which Smith gave at the suppression hearing
regarding his ownership interest in the letter, and the fact that he was
neither the sender nor the addressee of the letter.'
The court declined to establish a bright line rule that a person who is
neither the sender nor addressee of the letter could never have standing
to object to the search of the letter. The implication of the court's ruling
is that, had the defendant not equivocated concerning his ownership
interest in the letter, he could have had standing to challenge the search
even though his name did not appear on the envelope.
In United States v. Harris,"'the Eleventh Circuit upheld the validity
of a search warrant in a complex drug and money laundering conspiracy,
notwithstanding the fact that most of the information contained in the
search warrant affidavit recited events which took place over two years
prior to the application for the warrant.' The court noted that the
affidavit was sufficiently updated with contemporaneous information
which overcame the defendant's claim that the search warrant was
based on stale information." The updated information consisted of the
defendant's failure to report earnings or file income tax returns and
alleged that as of one week prior to the search, records indicated that no
state tax was being withheld for the defendant." Of greater significance to the court were the facts in the affidavit which indicated that the
defendant was maintaining an ongoing relationship with his co-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1144-45.
Id.

41. 20 F.3d 445 (11th Cir. 1994).

42. Id. at 451.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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conspirators as reflected by the observation of the co-conspirators at his
house. 45
In rejecting the defendant's staleness claim, the court stated that the
updated information supported the reasonable inference that criminal
activity was continuing because it showed that Harris had no visible
source of income, yet owned a large house, and that he continued to
associate with members of the drug conspiracy.'
This updated
information made it probable that drug-related activities took place or
that drug-related documents were stored at his house.47
This case demonstrates that the Eleventh Circuit court of appeals will
apply a more lenient standard when reviewing staleness challenges to
search warrants if the affidavit alleges a long standing and protracted
criminal conspiracy which is inherent in large-scale drug trafficking
operations." In reaching this conclusion, the court cited United States
v. Bascaro,49 for the proposition that "information supporting probable
cause receives liberal treatment when [a] large drug conspiracy is
involved."

III. FiFTH AMENDMENT
A.

The Right to Counsel and Self-Incrimination'
The fifteen-year-old defendant in Coleman v. Singletary"2 was
convicted for the murder of his ten-year-old sister. After strangling her,
wrapping her body in a blanket and hiding it in a closet, the defendant
rode his bicycle to a store where he bought some candy and a soft
drink."3 When arrested by a police officer, the defendant was advised
of his Miranda rights and subsequently interviewed. At some point
during the interview, a public defender was notified of Coleman's arrest;
the public defender then sent word to the interviewing officers to "cease
any further interview at this time."s' When this request was relayed

45. Id.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 742 F.2d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984).
50. 20 F.3d at 451.
51. Though the procedural safeguards established by the Supreme Court in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966) are not themselves constitutional rights, they do
serve as "measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is]
protected." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974).
52. 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994).
53. Id. at 1422.
54. Id.
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to the defendant, he gave an equivocal response concerning his desire to
end the interview.5 5 After asking a few clarifying questions, the officers
continued with the interview. On appeal of the denial of his habeas
corpus petition, the defendant contended that the officers ignored his
invocation of his Miranda rights, arguing that his response to the
officer's statement about what the public defender had said was a clear
invocation of his right to remain silent."
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the habeas petition, noting
that the rule in the Eleventh Circuit with regard to equivocal requests
for counsel is no longer viable in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Davis v. United States. 7 Prior to Davis, the rule in this
circuit required that "[wihen a defendant makes an equivocal request for
an attorney during a custodial interrogation, 'the scope of that interrogation is immediately narrowed to one subject and one only. Further
questioning thereafter must be limited to clarifying that request until it
is clarified.'"' This same rule was applied to equivocal invocations of
the right to terminate questioning.59 In changing this requirement, the
court acknowledged that "our prior decisions must yield to supervening
decisions of the Supreme Court. "s° Thus, "decisions creating a duty to
clarify a suspect's intent upon an equivocal invocation of counsel are no
longer good law."8 1 Adopting the Davis rule, the court of appeals held
as follows:
A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with
sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to
remain silent. If the statement is ambiguous or equivocal, then the
police have no duty to clarify the suspect's intent, and they may
proceed with the interrogation. 2

55. Id. at 1423. The defendant's specific response was "I don't know. But if [the public
defender] said to stop it I don't want to do what he said not to do." Id.
56. Id.

57. 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994).
58. 30 F.3d at 1423-24 (citing Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in

original)).
59. Id. at 1424. See also United States v. Pena, 897 F.2d 1075, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990).
60. 30 F.3d at 1424 (citing Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir.
1994)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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B.

Double Jeopardy
In United States v. Quiala,' conduct of the defendant's attorney
resulted in an unexpected windfall for the defendant. Quiala and nine
co-defendants were being tried in Key West, Florida on cocaine charges.
Quiala had requested a severance; that request was denied, but the trial
court did allow Quiala to proffer certain evidence after the jury had
returned its verdicts against the co-defendants and before they
deliberated as to his charges. This bifurcated trial could not be
completed in a day, so the trial judge scheduled closing arguments for
the following morning. Quiala's attorney, Ms. Diane Ward, did not
appear in court the next morning. Ms. Ward had taken a flight the
night before from Key West to Miami and was unable to get back to Key
West in time for trial. After waiting approximately an hour for Ms.
Ward, the district court declared a mistrial based upon defense counsel's
failure to appear. Prior to his second trial on the same charges, Quiala
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy
grounds. This motion was denied, and Quiala was tried, convicted and
sentenced to 235 months incarceration."
On appeal, Quiala contended that the trial court had erred in sua
sponte declaring a mistrial; the government asserted that the mistrial
was declared at the request, or at least at the inducement, of the
defendant.' The court of appeals first noted that it is possible for a
trial court to grant a mistrial after it has denied a defendant's motion
which states a particular ground, if later events at the trial support that
ground. However, it was clear to the court that such was not the case
at Quiala's first trial. Although Quiala had been seeking a severance
and a mistrial, the reasons he gave in his motions were not at all related
to why the trial court declared a mistrial, i.e., the unexcused absence of
defense counsel. Under these circumstances, the declaration of a
mistrial was clearly without consent of the defendant."6 The court then
turned to the issue of whether the declaration of a mistrial without the
consent of the defendant resulted from a "manifest necessity" to do so;

63. 19 F.3d 569 (11th Cir. 1994).
64. Id. at 570.
65. Id. at 571.

66. Id. The government also suggested that Ms. Ward's absence be considered a
strategic decision by defense
counsel to obtain a mistrial; if so characterized, retrial would not be barred. Id. (citing
United States v. Miller, 742 F.2d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216
(1985)). The court of appeals found no evidence to support the contention that Ward's

absence was deliberate and rejected that argument as well. Id.
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if this were the case, then the retrial would be legitimate.67 Clearly,
the mistrial was the district court's response to the delay and inconvenience caused by Ms. Ward's conduct, but the court of appeals determined that such conduct "does not constitute a manifest necessity to
justify granting a mistrial.'6 s "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not
contain a judicial economy exception." 9 As a result, the court reversed
the district court's order denying Quiala's motion to dismiss the
indictment and ordered the district court to vacate the judgment and
sentence rendered in the retrial. 70
IV.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

A.

Confrontation Clause
In United States v. Ross,7 ' the Eleventh Circuit considered for the
first time whether the admission of foreign business records pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3505 violated the Sixth Amendments Confrontation
Clause. 2 This case concerned a prosecution related to an international
marijuana and cocaine conspiracy involving two major drug organizations.7" During the trial, the government introduced into evidence
certain foreign business records pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505.74 This
section 3505 allows the admission of foreign records of regularly
conducted activity if supported by an affidavit meeting specifically
delineated standards.7' The central issue was whether the use of an
affidavit to authenticate foreign business records offends the Confrontation Clause.76
The court noted that, unlike Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Section 3505 does not require the custodian of the business
records to appear in court and, thus, does not qualify as a "firmly-rooted"

67. Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 572.
69. Id. (citing United States v. Chica, 14 F.3d 1527, 1532 (11th Cir. 1994)).
70. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Black stressed that the trial court's frustration
was the result of Ms. Ward's conduct and that such conduct was inconsiderate and a result
of poor judgement. Recognizing that her client should not be penalized for her conduct, it
was nevertheless suggested that she "might well have deserved sanctions." Id. at 572-73
(Black, J., concurring).
71. 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994).
72. Id. at 1515-16.
73. Id. at 1510.
74. Id. at 1515.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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hearsay exception. 7 Therefore, the court's inquiry was whether section
3505 bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to overcome the Sixth
Amendment's constitutional hurdle to the admissibility of hearsay.78
The court concluded that the bank records were sufficiently reliable
because the affidavit indicated that the record keeper, under criminal
penalty in his own country, asserted that the records were kept in the
ordinary course of business. 9
In that case the court also considered the trial judge's imposition of an
absolute ban on recross-examination of witnesses. The court noted that,
as opposed to cross-examination, a defendant has no constitutional right
to recross-examination.1 However, a defendant does have a limited
right to recross-examination when a new matter is brought out on
redirect examination."1 The court concluded that the Confrontation
Clause had been violated when the defendant was denied an opportunity
to recross-examine a government witness regarding new material elicited
on redirect examination.82 However, the court found the error to be
harmless.S'
The admission of confessions by nontestifying co-defendants continues
to cause significant problems for both trial and appellate courts. In
United States v. Costa," the Eleventh Circuit reversed a conviction
based on the improper admission of a co-defendant's confession.' This
case resulted from the prosecution of several defendants who were
involved in a cocaine conspiracy in Alabama." One of the defendants,
Mario DaCosta, made a custodial confession in which he implicated three
co-defendants.87 DaCosta's custodial confession was the only direct
evidence that the other defendants were knowing members of the
conspiracy.8

DaCosta was tried first after the district court granted a motion, to
After DaCosta's
sever his trial from that of the co-defendants.'

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1517.
Id.
Id. at 1518.
Id.

82. Id.

83. Id.
84.
85.
86.
87.

31 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.

88. Id.
89. Id.

19951

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1307

conviction, the government sought to call him as a government witness
against the other defendants. 90
At the trial of the co-defendants, DaCosta was granted use immunity
by the government but refused to testify.9 Given the self-imposed
unavailability of DaCosta, the government proposed to introduce his
custodial confession through the testimony of a DEA agent.92 The
defendants objected on the grounds that DaCosta's confession was
inadmissible hearsay and would violate their constitutional right of
The district court ruled that the confession was
confrontation."
admissible as a statement against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence."
The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that DaCosta's custodial
confession was not genuinely against his penal interest to the extent
that it directly implicated his co-defendants in the conspiracy.95 The
court referred to the recent Supreme Court case of Williamson v. United
States," which requires the trial court to make a fact-intensive inquiry
of the surrounding circumstances of the statement in order to determine
if it is truly against the declarant's penal interest.97 The Eleventh
Circuit found that the district court had failed to conduct such an
inquiry." The court noted that confessions by one defendant are
presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing other defendants'
conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product
of the declarant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, or divert
attention to another. 9
In United States v. Deeb,'00 the court reached a different result when
it considered the admissibility of the testimony of a co-conspirator given
at a prior trial at which the defendant was neither present nor
represented.' 0 ' Deeb and his co-defendant, Biamby, were charged
along with five others with importing approximately 490 kilograms of
cocaine in violation of federal narcotics laws. Biamby pled guilty and

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1076-77.
Id. at 1077.
Id.
Id.
114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
Id. at 2437.
31 F.3d at 1077-78.
Id. at 1078.
13 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1533.
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agreed to testify as a government witness. 2 Deeb failed to appear at
the trial and the district court severed the charges against Deeb and
proceeded with the trial against the remaining defendants. 0 3 Biamby
testified at that trial but neither Deeb nor his counsel were present for
°
any part of the trial.'O
Deeb was subsequently arrested in the Dominica Republic and brought
to Miami for trial." 5 Biamby was unable to testify at Deeb's trial
because he was terminally ill with AIDS and was suffering progressive
memory deterioration."° Biamby's testimony from the first trial was
admitted by the district court, in part, pursuant to the residual
hearsay
10 7
provision of Rule 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
On appeal, Deeb argued that Biamby's testimony was not admissible
under Rule 804(b)(5) and that its admission violated his rights under the
Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.' 8 The issue before the court
was whether Biamby's former testimony exhibited the indicia of
reliability necessary for admission under the residual hearsay exception
of Rule 804(b)(5).'
After an extensive analysis of the requirements
of the residual hearsay exception, the court concluded that the co-defendants' cross-examination of Biamby during the first trial afforded his
former testimony the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
required for admission under the Confrontation Clause."
B. Right to Counsel
Can a trial, or a portion of a trial, not be a "critical stage" for purposes
of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel? This issue was addressed by the
court in Vines v. United States,"' with a result which many may find
surprising. Miguel Vines and two co-defendants were indicted on drug
charges; Vimes and one of the co-defendants were tried together in a trial
which lasted two days and resulted in Vines being acquitted of one count
and convicted of the other.1 2 On the afternoon of the first day of trial,
the court excused Vines's attorney for the remainder of the day, even
though the government thereafter presented two witnesses. This excusal

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1534.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1534, 1537.
Id. at 1538.
Id. at 1541.
28 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1125-26.
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was at the request of counsel and came after Vines had purportedly
agreed to the absence." 3
On collateral review, Vines contended that his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel had been violated in two respects: first, he did not voluntarily
and knowingly waive his right to counsel, and second, he was denied
effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's absence during the
taking of evidence." 4 In support of his contentions, Vines argued that
the temporary absence of counsel results in an irrebuttable presumption
of prejudice, citing United States v. Cronic." The court of appeals
disagreed:
Vines argues that under Cronic the taking of evidence is a critical
stage of trial per se. Vines proffers no authority that compels this
court to reach that conclusion; and, we decline to give birth to a rule
that the taking of evidence is necessarily a critical stage of trial ....
Where, as in this case, no evidence directly inculpating a defendant is
presented while that defendant's counsel is absent, we decline to hold
that counsel was absent during a critical stage of trial within the
1
meaning of Cronic."

The court then turned to what it considered the "appropriate
analytical framework" for deciding the issue."' First, it determined
that the temporary absence of Vines' counsel was a "trial error" and not
a "structural defect", the importance of the distinction being that trial
The court phrased
errors are subject to the harmless-error analysis.'

113. Id. at 1126 n.3. Although the court mentioned the colloquy between the trial court
and Vine's attorney as to the requested absence, it specifically declined to address the issue
of whether Vines had made a legitimate waiver of his right to counsel. Id.
114. Id. at 1126-27.
115. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, the Supreme Court stated that prejudice would
be presumed if, (1) counsel is completely denied; (2) counsel is denied at a critical stage of
trial; or (3) counsel fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.
Id. at 659.
116. 28 F.3d at 1128. Two witnesses were presented by the government after Vines'
attorney had been excused for the day: the Customs case agent and the owner of the
warehouse where the drugs were to be sent. Each was cross-examined by counsel for
Vines' co-defendant. Exhibits were also admitted into evidence during the testimony of
these witnesses. Id. at 1133. The dissent was particularly forceful on this point,
questioning the majority's attempt to extract portions of a trial and label them as noncritical for Sixth Amendment purposes. Id. at 1139, 1141.
117. Id. at 1128.
118. Id. at 1129. The most important distinction between trial errors and structural
defects is that the former can be assessed in the context of other evidence to determine
whether or not they are harmless, whereas the latter are of such severity that they affect
the conduct of the entire trial. Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264
(1991); Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 1336 (11th Cir. 1993, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1107,
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its task as determining "whether the temporary absence of Vines's
counsel during the testimony of [the two witnesses] had a substantial
influence on the jury's verdict in this case."" 9 The majority concluded
that it did not, and thus, the absence of Vines's counsel was harmless. 2 o
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Birch took issue with every phase of the
majority's analysis because, in his opinion, they had failed to identify
what was the crucial issue in the case:
By taking a harmless error analytical approach, the majority has
overlooked the principal constitutional violation and issue on appeal:
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Counsel's absence
from trial, complete or temporary, is a fundamental constitutional
deprivation that is not amenable to harmless error exception. While
constitutional waiver of the right to counsel
is recognized, it is doubtful
12
that such waiver occurred in this case. 1
The dissent's concern over the legitimacy of the waiver was based on
the fact that Vines did not speak or "comprehensively understand
English," 2 and there was no indication that an interpreter was
present when the trial court excused his attorney. 23 Nor was there
anything in the record to indicate that the trial court had made any
attempt to determine
if Vines's waiver was knowingly, intelligently and
124

voluntarily made.

Thus, it was the waiver issue which the dissent considered as crucial for
determination on appeal.
And it was this very issue which the majority
25
chose not to address.

In Rogers v. Zant,126 the petitioner's request for relief was granted
by the district court on the ground that petitioner had received
ineffective assistance of counsel; the court of appeals reversed this
decision. 2 Rogers had been convicted and sentenced to death for the
murder of his neighbor. An investigation of the case revealed that
Rogers may have been intoxicated and under the influence of an
hallucinogen at the time of the murder, but his trial counsel chose not

1126(1994)).
119. Id. at 1130.
120. Id. at 1131.
121. Id. at 1131-32 (Birch, J., dissenting).

122. Id. at 1132.
123. Id. at 1134.

124. Id. at 1136.
125. Id. at 1126 n.3.
126. 13 F.3d 384 (11th Cir. 1994).

127. Id. at 388.
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to investigate what effects that may have had on him, nor did they rely
on the intoxication issue at trial and sentencing. This decision was
based on the attorneys' knowledge of the community and how a jury
would likely react to such evidence presented in mitigation. 128 The
district court decided that the failure to investigate and present evidence
of the effects of the drug rendered counsel ineffective.' 29 In reversing
this decision, the court of appeals stressed that it is not necessary for
trial counsel to do a thorough investigation prior to making all strategic
decisions in a case; "[bjy its nature, 'strategy' can include a decision not
In addition, it is not necessary for defense lawyers
to investigate."'
to assert every nonfrivolous defense in order to avoid being labeled
ineffective; such "stacking" of defenses may very well damage the
credibility of the defense, as a "multiplicity of arguments or defenses
hints at the lack of confidence in any one." 3'
V.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

A substantial number of cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit during
the survey period involved issues related to the application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Although most of the cases discussed in
this section do not involve constitutional issues, the decision was made
to include them because of the significance of the cases to the court's
application of the Sentencing Guidelines.
In a case of first impression, the appellant in United States v. Byse s2
challenged on equal protection grounds the harsher sentences imposed
for offenses involving crack cocaine. 133 Byse contended that 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) had a disparate impact on African
Americans and Hispanics because the penalties for possession and
distribution of crack cocaine were more severe than those for powder
cocaine. 3 4 It was the first case in the Eleventh Circuit in which an
appellant contended that this disparate impact was the result of
intentional discrimination by Congress against minorities. 135 In
denying Byse's claim, the court noted that he failed to produce any

128. Id. at 387.
129. Id. at 385.
130. Id. at 387.
131. Id. at 388 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983)).
132. 28 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1994).
133. Id. at 1167.
134. Id. at 1168. The Sentencing Guidelines treat one gram of cocaine base or "crack"
cocaine as the equivalent of one hundred grams of powder cocaine for sentencing purposes.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (Drug Equivalency Tables). Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(bXl) provides certain
mandatory minimum sentences using the same 100 to 1 ratio.
135. 28 F.3d at 1168.
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evidence whatsoever of discriminatory purpose by Congress or the
Sentencing Commission in establishing harsher sentencing penalties for
crack cocaine."
The court reviewed the legislative history of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) which revealed that Congress imposed harsher
penalties for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine because "it '(1) has
a more rapid onset of action, (2) is more potent, (3) is more highly
addictive, (4) is less expensive than cocaine powder, and (5) has
137
widespread availability.'"
The court was called upon to determine the meaning of "cocaine base"
in United States v. Munoz-Realpe.' 8 Munoz-Realpe was arrested at
Miami International Airport with six liquor bottles containing a liquid
that tested positive for cocaine base." 9 The defendant contended that,,
since the cocaine base was in liquid form, it could not be used without
further processing and should be treated for sentencing purposes as
cocaine powder. 40 The government contended that even though the
cocaine base was in liquid form, it met the scientific, chemical definition
of cocaine base which required the harsher sentence. 4
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that unless cocaine base had
been processed into "crack cocaine," it is treated as cocaine hydrochloride
(powder) for sentencing purposes.'42 The court based its decision on
the amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), effective November 1, 1993,
which contains the following definition: "'Cocaine base,' for the purposes
of this guideline means 'crack.' 'Crack' is the street name for a form of
cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and
sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike
form." 4" The court noted that the sentencing guideline amendment
eroded the precedental value of United States v. Rodriguez,'" in which
the court had held that the term "cocaine base" was not limited to crack
cocaine, but included all forms of cocaine base according to the scientific
meaning of the term. 4 5 The court left open the issue of whether the

136. Id. at 1169.
137. Id. (quoting United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947,950-53 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1311 (1994)).

138. 21 F.3d 375 (l1th Cir. 1994).
139. Id. at 376.
140. Id.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 377.
Id.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) Explanation of terms following Drug Quantity Table.
980 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3003 (1993).

145.

980 F.2d at 1377.
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amended guideline definition of cocaine base would be applied retroactively.24
The issue of retroactivity was decided in United States v. Camacho."'7 The Eleventh Circuit held that the amendment to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c) defining cocaine base as "crack" was not intended by the
Thus, the
Sentencing Commission to have retroactive effect."
to
November
prior
amendment does not apply to defendants sentenced
149
1, 1993, the effective date of the amendment.
There were also some significant developments in cases involving the
clarification under the Sentencing Guidelines of "career offenders" and
"armed career criminals." United States v. Stinson,"° was remanded
to the Eleventh Circuit from the United States Supreme Court. 51
Stinson had been convicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and was sentenced in July 1990
as a "career offender." 52 At the time Stinson was sentenced, the
conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was used as
the predicate "crime of violence" necessary for establishing career
53
After Stinson was sentenced, the Sentencing
offender status."
Commission amended the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 to provide
that the term "crime of violence" does not include the offense of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon.' 5" The Eleventh Circuit decided to
follow the Second and Fifth Circuits and applied the amendment
retroactively.' The effect of this decision is to significantly reduce the
prison sentences of those defendants who had been previously classified
as career offenders based on a predicate offense of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Oliver... that
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not constitute a "violent

146. 21 F.3d at 377 n.4.
147. 40 F.3d 349 (11th Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 353-54.
149. Id. at 354.
150. 30 F.3d 121 (11th Cir. 1994).
151. Id. at 122.
152. Id. A defendant is a "career offender" if: (1) the defendant was at least eighteen
years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant
has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense. U.S.S.G § 4B1.1.
153. 30 F.3d at 122.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 20 F.3d 415 (11th Cir. 1994).
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felony" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, which defines an armed
career criminal.16 7
In United States v. Lipsey," the court decided a case of first impression involving the classification of a career offender under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1, based on two prior controlled substance convictions.' 9
Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that a defendant
convicted of a controlled substance felony offense should be treated as a
career offender if he has two prior qualifying controlled substance
convictions.' ° In this case, Lipsey's career offender status was based
in part on an underlying state conviction for possessing valium with
intent to distribute. 1 ' Lipsey urged the court to look beyond the
elements of the crime to the facts underlying his conviction. He
contended that, although he pleaded guilty to the state offense, at the
time he entered his plea, he denied that he had any intent to distribute.162 The court held that a court should look at the elements of the
convicted offense, not the conduct underlying the conviction, in
determining if a prior conviction is a controlled substance offense to
qualify the defendant as a career offender."6 This case is an illustration of the reluctance of trial and appellate courts to become involved
with issues that require factual inquiries into the specific conduct
underlying an earlier conviction, provided the conviction appears valid
on its face.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

A.

Right to Appeal
In United States v. Ortega-Rodriguez,'"'the court established a new
test for determining whether a fugitive has lost his or her right to
appeal. Ortega-Rodriguez and two co-defendants were convicted of
several drug charges. Although his two co-defendants made it to

157. A defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is
an armed career criminal. U.S.S.G. § 4131.4. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a defendant is
subject to an enhanced sentence if the instant offense of conviction is a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (possession of firearm by convicted felon) and the defendant has at least
three prior convictions for a "violent felony" or "serious drug offense," or both, committed
on occasions different from one another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, comment n.1.
158. No. 93-9076, slip op. 755 (11th Cir. Dec. 27, 1994).
159. Id., slip op. at 756.
160. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
161. No. 93-9076, slip op. at 756.
162. Id.
163. Id.

164. 13 F.3d 1474 (11th Cir. 1994).
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sentencing, Ortega-Rodriguez did not, and the trial court sentenced him
in absentia. When finally apprehended, he was indicted for contempt of
court and failure to appear but, at his counsel's request, he was
resentenced on the drug convictions. Subsequently, he filed a notice of
appeal on the drug convictions; the government responded by filing a
motion to dismiss based on the fugitive dismissal rule established in
United States v. Holmes.'" That motion was granted, OrtegaRodriguez filed a petition for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted
the petition. The Supreme Court then vacated the court of appeal's
order and remanded the case for further consideration.ls' In essence,
the court of appeals was instructed to fashion a less stringent rule for
determining when a fugitive would lose the right to appeal. 67 The
concern was that there be more room for discretion when applying the
automatic dismissal rule to a former fugitive's appeal.168
In response, the court of appeals established a two prong test to apply
when determining whether a former fugitive has forfeited the right to
appeal. The court held that such an appeal should be dismissed unless
the defendant can show that "(1) granting the appeal is not likely to
result in an undue burden on the government; and (2) the defendant's
flight has not resulted in nor [sic] will not result in significant interference with the operation of the judicial process in either the district court
or the appellate court.""6 9 The court enumerated several factors to be
considered in determining whether a defendant has met this burden.
For instance, as to the first prong, attention should be paid to the
availability of evidence and witnesses in the event of remand for a new
trial, the complexity of proof of the substantive crime, and any burden

165. 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir.1982). In Holmes, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that "a
defendant who flees after conviction, but before sentencing, waives his right to appeal from
the conviction unless he can establish that his absence was due to matters completely
beyond his control." Id. at 1373.
166. 13 F.3d at 1475.
167. According to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit in Holmes had "overextended" what has been called the "disentitlement" theory:
No pervasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits

of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes
from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While such an

escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court
for determination of his claims.

Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970). See also Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534
(1975).
168. 13 F.3d at 1476.
169. Id.
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the government undergoes as a result of the appellate process itself.'70
Concerning the second prong, a factor to consider is what the court
called "the duplication of appellate efforts."'
In essence, this means
that if a fugitive defendant had co-defendants and their appeals were
considered by the court, then the court is not going to be inclined to look
at the case again for the fugitive.'72 These factors were offered by the
court as being illustrative and not definitive of the things to consider in
applying the new test. 7 ' Only time will tell if this new rule will have
any noticeable effect on this type appeal; nevertheless, it does give the
unsuccessful fugitive more grist to argue that the appellate court should
consider the merits of his appeal, notwithstanding his conduct.
B.

Guilty Plea
In an issue of first impression in this circuit, and apparently in any
circuit, the court in United States v. Morse74 considered whether or
not it is required to inform a defendant pleading guilty that in doing so,
he may become ineligible for receipt of federal benefits. Donald Morse
pled guilty in district court to various drug charges and was sentenced
to 105 months in prison; additionally, the court ordered that Morse be
ineligible for federal benefits for a period of five years.'75 On appeal,
Morse contended that his plea was invalid because the district court did
not tell him that he could lose federal benefits if he pled, and this was
required by Rule 11.' 7 The court found this contention to be without
merit: "Rule 11 does not require a sentencing court to inform a
defendant of every possible consequence of his plea."'77 In addition,
the pre-sentence report prepared by the probation officer specifically set
out the statutory and guideline provisions which allow a sentencing
judge to deny federal benefits; because the defense indicated that the
report had been read and there was no objection to it, there was no
ground for complaint on appeal. Accordingly, the guilty plea was not
vacated and Mr. Morse was left with only one source of federal support
for the next 105 months.

170.

Id. at 1477.

171. Id.
172. Id.
173.

Id. at 1477 n.6. Query: would the additional burden the government must endure

in writing a second brief and arguing a second time--assuming a co-defendant's appeal had
been completed-be considered sufficient to find that a former fugitive was not entitled to
an appeal?
174. 36 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 1994).
175. Id. at 1071.
176. Id. at 1072.
177. Id. (quoting Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1989)).
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C. In-Custody Statements and Miranda
As a rule, Miranda warnings must be given prior to any "custodial
interrogation." 17 8 However, general "on-the-scene questioning" by law
enforcement to determine the facts and circumstances of a crime or other
general questioning of citizens does not require that the warnings be
given. 17 What if the general "on-the-scene questioning" occurs in a
prison where all of the potential witnesses are without question in
custody; does a person's status as an inmate automatically constitute "incustody" for Miranda purposes? This was the issue of first impression
for the court in Garcia v. Singletary."8 While extinguishing a fire set
by Garcia, a deputy asked Garcia why he had started the fire. Garcia's
reply was "I no get my canteen .... I got my rights."81 After his
conviction for arson and exhaustion of his state remedies, Garcia
proceeded to federal court, filing his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
His claim was that it was error to admit the above incriminating
statement because the deputy had failed to inform him of his Miranda
rights. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals accepted
Garcia's argument that because he was in prison he was necessarily "incustody" for Miranda purposes. After considering how the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits had handled the issue, the court determined that to
trigger Miranda in a prison setting, there must be some change in the
surroundings of the prisoner which result in an "added imposition on his
freedom of movement."8 2 Because the totality of the circumstances
did not evidence such an additional restraint of freedom in Garcia's case,
and because the deputy's question was basically a "spontaneous reaction
to a startling event," the court found that Miranda warnings were not
a prerequisite and that Garcia's incriminating statement was properly
admitted against him.'83
D. Batson
In dealing with Batson challenges, there are a number of different
ways the courts can analyze an attorney's exercise of peremptory strikes
to determine whether or not there is a discriminatory intent operating.
In Hollingsworth v.Burton,' the prosecution and lower courts focused

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Id. at 477.
13 F.3d 1487 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1489.
Id. at 1492 (quoting Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978)).
Id.

184.

30 F.3d 109 (11th Cir. 1994).
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on comparing stricken white jurors with stricken black jurors and
determining whether or not there was some parity as to disqualifying
factors which would justify the strikes, regardless of race.1" 5 The court
of appeals issued a reminder that although such an analysis is
appropriate, it is likewise appropriate in a Batson challenge to compare
stricken blacks to seated whites;"' the court then applied this analysis. It is important to note that even if a seated juror and one who was
struck had a common disqualifying factor, the court did not find that
dispositive of discriminatory intent; the totality of factors was considered
to decide if any racial animus existed. 87 The court determined that
there were "significant non-race-based differences between seated white
jurors and stricken black potential jurors"'lS to find that the prosecution's exercise of peremptory strikes was legitimate.
E.

ProsecutorialMisconduct
The court of appeals instructed the district court to grant a writ of
8 based on the overzealous objection
habeas corpus in Davis v. Zant"'
and argument of the prosecution. Davis and a co-defendant were
charged with murder. Some six months before Davis' trial, his codefendant confessed that she had committed the murder and not Davis.
She consistently maintained this story throughout Davis' trial, although
she would not testify at his trial; the State was aware of the codefendant's admission.' When attempts were made by Davis' counsel
to inform the jury of the co-defendant's confession, the State objected on
hearsay grounds, and in the course of the objection stated that it was not
true that the co-defendant had confessed. 1" The court agreed that the
hearsay objection was entirely appropriate, but the surplusage claiming
that the confession had not been made was improper because the State
knew that the confession had been made. Even so, the court stated that
this "miscue" alone would not have amounted to a constitutional
violation warranting a new trial.92 However, in addition to this
indiscretion, the prosecutor made numerous references in his closing

185. Id. at 111.
186. Id. at 112 (citing United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551-52 (11th Cir.
1991); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 1990) (Hatchett, J.,
concurring); Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2795 (1991)).
187. Id. at 112-13.
188. Id. at 113.
189. 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994).
190. Id. at 1540.
191. Id. at 1546-47.
192. Id. at 1548.
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argument that the claim of his co-defendant's confession was a last
minute fabrication by Davis that it was "thought up" during trial, after
the prosecution had rested.19 These arguments were made by the
State's counsel even though he knew that the co-defendant had in fact
confessed. The court found that "the prosecutor intentionally painted for
the jury a distorted picture of the realities of this case in order to secure
a conviction"' 4 and that, considered in the context of the entire trial,
these improper remarks rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.19

193.
194.
195.

Id, at 1547.
Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1551.

